Discontinuous Nash Equilibria in a Two Stage Linear-Quadratic Dynamic Game with Linear Constraints
Discontinuous Nash Equilibria in a Two Stage Linear-Quadratic Dynamic Game with Linear Constraints
Autor
Punktacja ministerialna
200
Data publikacji
Abstrakt (EN)
In this paper, we study a simple example of a two-stage linear-quadratic dynamic game in which pres- ence of simple linear state dependent constraints results in non-existence of continuous symmetric feedback Nash equilibria and existence of continuum of discontinuous symmetric feedback Nash equilibria. The example is not an abstract model — it has obvious applications in economics of resource extraction.
Dyscyplina PBN
matematyka
Czasopismo
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Tom
64
Zeszyt
7
Strony od-do
3074 - 3079
ISSN
0018-9286
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