Logical Analysis against Superstitions: Józef M. Bocheński on the Social Role of Philosophy

According to Józef M. Bocheński, philosophers should analyze and not moralize. Bocheński also wrote that the philosophers’ aim is to battle with superstitions. The present paper concerns the question of how philosophical analysis may serve this aim. In the first part of the paper, the kinds and tools of philosophical analysis are presented. In particular, the objects of philosophical analysis (concepts and statements) as well as logical “instruments” of analysis are discussed. In the second part, the concept of superstition (or prejudice) is analyzed. Taking Bocheński’s definition as the point of departure, some essential distinctions involved in this concept are explained, for instance the distinction between truthfulness of a statement and somebody’s acceptance of a statement, and the distinction between a false statement and an obviously false statement. Next, the mechanism of fighting against superstitions by means of analysis is shown using examples taken from Bocheński’s book Sto zabobonów [One Hundred Superstitions] (1987). Superstitions connected with authority, patriotism, and tolerance are analyzed.