China’s junior partner. Russia's Korean Policy

Russia’s policy towards the conflict over the North Korean nuclear program, which in 2017-18 assumed the proportions of a serious international crisis, has been subordinated to its geopolitical goals in the region and to the strategy it is pursuing on a global scale. Its long-term goal is to prevent the reunification of the Korean peninsula under the aegis of the United States and to weaken the US’s position in the region. Its shortterm goal is to avert the danger of an outbreak of armed conflict on the peninsula and the possible collapse of North Korea. • Russia’s support for the reunification of the two Korean states is purely declaratory; in practice the Kremlin is striving to maintain the political status quo on the peninsula. At the same time, Russia wants to maximise its influence by developing economic relations and maintaining political contacts with both Koreas. • Moscow does not view the denuclearisation of North Korea as one of its priorities. Its approach to Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is instrumental; in Moscow’s eyes, although the program poses certain risks for Russia, it also opens a number of opportunities. Officially, Moscow condemns Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. However, until autumn 2017 it effectively blocked Western proposals on the UN Security Council to impose economic sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). • The course of the crisis so far has demonstrated that Russia does not have sufficient tools to influence the course of events. As a consequence, it has had to accept a role as China’s ‘junior partner’ in the Korean issue. Russia’s reduced role could be best seen in August-September 2017 when, under China’s influence, it reversed its position on the Security Council and approved the introduction of sanctions against the DPRK. POINT OF VIEW 12/2018 6 • The Kremlin was satisfied with the results of the June 2018 meeting between US President Donald Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, once it turned out that they would not lead to a rapid denuclearisation of the DPRK, while at the same time reducing the risk of American military action on the Korean peninsula. In this situation, Moscow made every effort to conceal the fact that during the most severe stage of the crisis in 2017, its role turned out to be of secondary importance compared to those of Washington, Beijing and Seoul