Russian Disinformation as a National Security Threat for the Republic of Moldova

The thesis examines Russian disinformation as a national security threat to the Republic of Moldova, asking to what extent such operations threaten Moldovan security. Arguments are presented across the three chapters. Chapter 1 is the one establishing the structural vulnerabilities of Moldova, the unresolved Transnistrian conflict, the two-bank economic asymmetry, and the divided societal landscape, all of which stem as a result of engineering from the Soviet era having shaped the Moldovan security environment since independence in 1991. A structured reading of Moldovan strategic documents from 1991 to 2025 traces how the official framing of Russia evolved from cautious neutrality language towards a explicit multi-domain threat, culminating in the 2023 National Security Strategy. Chapter 2 explains the Russian disinformation within the historical traditions of Soviet active measures and dezinformatsiya, identifying the four narrative clusters deployed in Moldova: anti-Western framing, idealization of ties with Russia, manipulation of the Transnistrian conflict, and appeals to traditional values. It highlights the operational toolbox which the narratives are distributed, amplified, and legitimized, presenting the tools functions as an integrated chain of operation rather than isolated tactics. Chapter 3 assesses the impact through two case studies of the recent combined 2024 presidential election/EU accession referendum, and the 2025 parliamentary, documenting the evolution of the disinformation apparatus between cycles and mapping the vulnerabilities across demographic groups and platforms. The thesis argues that Russian disinformation in Moldova constitutes a multi-domain national security challenge rooted in Soviet-era structural vulnerabilities, and evaluates the extent to which Moldova's institutional response between 2023 and 2025 has addressed this challenge.