Phenomenology and mechanisms of consciousness: Considering the theoretical integration of phenomenology with a mechanistic framework

In this article, I consider the possibility of a theoretical integration of phenomenology and a mechanistic framework. First, I discuss the mechanistic model of explanation and the idea of theoretical integration in science as opposed to unification. I argue that the mechanistic model of explanation is preferable for integrating the cognitive sciences, although it is limited and in the case of consciousness studies should be complemented with phenomenology. Second, I examine three possible approaches to the integration of phenomenology and the mechanistic model of explanation. First, I discuss Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness and propose a new argument against IIT’s axiomatic method—namely, I argue that IIT misuses the notion of axiom. Next, I discuss two different proposals for the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences: front-loaded phenomenology and neurophenomenology. I argue that these proposals cannot be integrated with a mechanistic framework unless requisite modifications are made.