The Russian hybrid warfare from the 2008 war in Georgia to the 2014 conflict in Ukraine

Studies of military conflicts at the beginning of the twenty-first century show that new forms of armed conflicts have emerged among states to achieve political goals. The so-called “hybrid warfare” replaces traditional types of armed conflicts. The Russian intervention in Crimea is a vivid example of hybrid warfare, that resulted in the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula with the use of asymmetric tactics and methods. The phenomenon of hybrid war is to be explored in the context of Russia’s actions in Georgia and Ukraine. The prerequisites and strategic goals of the Russian hybrid war to be examine. Russia’s use of conventional and non-conventional means to achieve its own goals. The scope of the analysis covers Russia’s implementation of hybrid warfare in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. The purpose is to examine the peculiarities of conducting a hybrid war of the Russian Federation against Georgia and de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Russia’s approach to hybrid warfare is considered an all-out battle that employs a combination of military and non-military means, such as propaganda, deception, and disinformation. Hybrid method of warfare used by Russia in Georgia and Ukraine are examined. By proposing the case study of these two countries, this paper shows the main stages and features Russia implements while conducting hybrid warfare, using it as a mean to protect its interests and to weaken other countries from the inside. Russia’s approach to warfare in the context of the Georgian War and the annexation of Crimea sets a new form of fighting, exploiting the characteristics of proxy warfare.