Prospects for an Animalistically Oriented Simple View

Animalism is a metaphysical doctrine according towhich human persons are biological organisms of the species Homo sapiens. The Simple View of personal identity claims that there are no non-circular informative metaphysical criteria of personal identity in the form of both necessary and sufficient conditions. In the philosophical literature, both views are presented almost exclusively as competing. The main goal of the paper is to find out whether it is at all possible to reconcile some variant of animalism with the idea that there are no criteria of personal identity. In other words, the text attempts to determine what conditions must be met for someone to be both an animalist and an adherent of the Simple View. The first part of the paper offers a detailed reconstruction of the Simple View and various forms of animalism. In the second part, three different strategies for an integration of the Simple View and animalism are presented and briefly discussed. Although these strategies are put forward very tentatively, some points in favour of the third strategy are provided. According to this approach, “person” is a semantically complex, referentially permanent, and open-ended phase sortal term, expressing both metaphysical and normative (forensic) aspects of meaning, and, consequently, its character calls into question the possibility of providing appropriate criteria of personal identity.