Dodatkowy warunek racjonalności manewru z zasadnej stwierdzalności

In the paper I present a warranted assertability maneuver (WAM) against Gettier’s famous arguments and argue that it satisfies all the criteria for reasonable and sound WAM proposed once by Keith DeRose. If WAM proposed in the article is correct, then Gettier’s argumentation is less sound that it has seemed before and the conclusiveness of it becomes questionable. However, if the Gettier cases are to show that traditional definition of knowledge is too broad and should not be explained in terms of generating false conversational implicatures by true assertions of Gettier’s sentences, then there should be some other criteria which are not satisfied by WAM in Gettier case discussion. Therefore I propose fourth criterion for reasonable WAM: If in a context C assertion of sentence S is unacceptable only because it generates some false conversational implicatures I1,…, In, then assertion of S in any other context C* generating false I1,…, In is unacceptable to the same extent as the assertion of S in C.