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Selecting a winner with external referees

dc.abstract.enWe consider a problem of mechanism design without money, where a planner selects a winner among a set of agents with binary types and receives outside signals (like the report of external referees). We show that there is a gap between the optimal Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mechanism and the optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) mechanism. In the optimal BIC mechanism, the planner can leverage the outside signal to elicit information about agents' types. BIC mechanisms are lexicographic mechanisms, where the planner first shortlists agents who receive high reports from the referees and then uses agents' reports to break ties among agents in the shortlist. We compare the “self-evaluation” mechanism with a “peer evaluation” mechanism where agents evaluate other agents, and show that for the same signal precision, the self- evaluation mechanism outperforms the peer evaluation mechanism. We show that optimal Ex Post Incentive Compatible (EPIC) mechanisms give the planner an intermediate value between the optimal DSIC and BIC mechanisms
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorDziubiński, Marcin
dc.contributor.authorDutta, Bhaskar
dc.contributor.authorBloch, Francis
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-26T07:30:53Z
dc.date.available2024-01-26T07:30:53Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.financePublikacja bezkosztowa
dc.description.volume211
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/J.JET.2023.105687
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/119548
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://api.elsevier.com/content/article/PII:S0022053123000832?httpAccept=text/xml
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationcomputer and information sciences
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Theory
dc.relation.pages105687
dc.rightsClosedAccess
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.titleSelecting a winner with external referees
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication