Artykuł w czasopiśmie
Brak miniatury
Licencja
Knowledge of Consequences: An Explanation of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect
dc.abstract.en | The Knobe effect (Analysis 63(3):190–194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter (Mind Lang 25:474–498, 2010) have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE): people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I present a new explanation of ESEE. I argue that when people attribute knowledge in morally negative cases, they express a consequence-knowledge claim (knowledge that a possible consequence of an action is that harm will occur) rather than a predictive claim (knowledge that harm will actually occur). I use the omissions account (Paprzycka in Mind Lang 30(5):550–571, 2015) to explain why the consequence-knowledge claim is particularly salient in morally negative cases. Unlike the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. in Monist 95(2):264–289, 2012), the omissions account can explain the persistence of ESEE in the so-called slight-chance of harm conditions. I present the results of empirical studies that test the predictions of the account. I show that ESEE occurs in Butler-type scenarios. Some of the studies involve close replications of Nadelhoffer’s (Analysis 64(3):277–284, 2004) study. |
dc.affiliation | Uniwersytet Warszawski |
dc.contributor.author | Paprzycka-Hausman, Katarzyna |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-01-25T04:48:33Z |
dc.date.available | 2024-01-25T04:48:33Z |
dc.date.copyright | 2018-10-17 |
dc.date.issued | 2020 |
dc.description.accesstime | BEFORE_PUBLICATION |
dc.description.finance | Publikacja bezkosztowa |
dc.description.number | 12 |
dc.description.version | FINAL_PUBLISHED |
dc.description.volume | 197 |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/S11229-018-01973-1 |
dc.identifier.issn | 0039-7857 |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/110424 |
dc.identifier.weblink | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-018-01973-1 |
dc.language | eng |
dc.pbn.affiliation | philosophy |
dc.relation.ispartof | Synthese |
dc.relation.pages | 5457-5490 |
dc.rights | CC-BY |
dc.sciencecloud | nosend |
dc.subject.en | Epistemic side-effect effect |
dc.subject.en | Intentional omission |
dc.subject.en | Knobe effect |
dc.subject.en | Knowledge |
dc.subject.en | Consequences |
dc.subject.en | Doxastic heuristic account |
dc.subject.en | Replication |
dc.title | Knowledge of Consequences: An Explanation of the Epistemic Side-Effect Effect |
dc.type | JournalArticle |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |