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Turning Relative Deprivation into a Performance Incentive Device

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cris.lastimport.scopus2024-02-12T20:15:04Z
dc.abstract.enThe inclination of individuals to improve their performance when it lags behind that of others with whom they naturally compare themselves can be harnessed to optimize the individuals’ effort in work and study. In a given set of individuals, we characterize each individual by his relative deprivation, which measures by how much the individual trails behind other individuals in the set doing better than him. We seek to divide the set into an exogenously predetermined number of groups (subsets) in order to maximize aggregate relative deprivation, so as to ensure that the incentive for the individuals to work or study harder because of unfavorable comparison with others is at its strongest. We find that the solution to this problem depends only on the individuals’ ordinally measured levels of performance independent of the performance of comparators.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorStark, Oded
dc.contributor.authorKosiorowski, Grzegorz
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-26T11:07:55Z
dc.date.available2024-01-26T11:07:55Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.financePublikacja bezkosztowa
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/0022250X.2020.1787407
dc.identifier.issn0022-250X
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/123904
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationeconomics and finance
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Mathematical Sociology
dc.rightsClosedAccess
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enSocial preferences
dc.subject.enRelative deprivation
dc.subject.enEffort elicitation
dc.subject.enAssignment to groups
dc.subject.enPerformance optimization
dc.titleTurning Relative Deprivation into a Performance Incentive Device
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication