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From the Schematism to the Typic. How Can We Be moral?

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dc.abstract.plKant’s chapter “On the Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgement” is one of the most obscure passages of the Critique of Practical Reasonand it has often been regarded as a mere appendix. However, it deals with a fundamental question, namely, how can the pure practical law be applied to particular cases. In this paper, I would like to make an original contribution towards a better understanding of this chapter by comparing it to the Schematism chapter on the basis of their analogical relation and suggesting how the reference to a sensus communiscould help in solving the (unsolved) aim of the Typic chapter.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorScaglia, Lara
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-25T01:37:38Z
dc.date.available2024-01-25T01:37:38Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.accesstimeAT_PUBLICATION
dc.description.financePublikacja bezkosztowa
dc.description.versionFINAL_PUBLISHED
dc.description.volume13
dc.identifier.doi10.5281/ZENODO.4899265
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/107578
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/589/968
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofCon-textos Kantianos
dc.relation.pages323-343
dc.rightsCC-BY-NC
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enTypic
dc.subject.enanalogy
dc.subject.enschema
dc.subject.encommon sense
dc.titleFrom the Schematism to the Typic. How Can We Be moral?
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication