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Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl

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cris.lastimport.scopus2024-02-12T20:16:24Z
dc.abstract.enPhilosophical intuition has become one of the most debated problems in recent years, largely due to the rise of the movement called experimental philosophy which challenged the conviction that philosophers have some special insight into abstract ideas such as being, knowledge, good and evil, intentional action, etc. In response to the challenge, some authors claim that there is a special cognitive faculty called philosophical intuition which delivers justification to philosophical theses, while some others deny it based on experimental results. A relatively smaller group of researchers aim at clarifying what the alleged intuition is. I follow the latter path. In this paper I argue that philosophical intuition is in the first place the capacity enabling one to what I refer to as the recognition of one’s epistemic position. The latter means becoming aware of the seemingly trivial “fact” that the way in which the world manifests itself depends on the cognitive apparatus one has, thereby propelling one to draw a distinction between appearances and reality. The recognition at stake is a very specific capacity to approach the world solely as it is experienced. This capacity, I argue, is the core and the defining feature of philosophical intuition. As part of my argumentation I also distinguish between the intuition in question and its different manifestations; and then introduce a novel notion of erotetic intuition. My argument is called “old-fashion” to emphasize the fact that I draw mostly on four figures who were pivotal in the twentieth- century philosophy and whose influence on the current debate concerning philosophical intuition should be, I believe, stronger than it is; I mean Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorWerner, Konrad
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-25T16:36:12Z
dc.date.available2024-01-25T16:36:12Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.accesstimeAT_PUBLICATION
dc.description.financePublikacja bezkosztowa
dc.description.number5
dc.description.versionFINAL_PUBLISHED
dc.description.volume48
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/S11406-020-00195-5
dc.identifier.issn0048-3893
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/115807
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11406-020-00195-5.pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophia
dc.relation.pages1725-1751
dc.rightsOther
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enPhilosophical intuition
dc.subject.enExpertise defense
dc.subject.enExperimental philosophy
dc.subject.enAnalytic philosophy
dc.subject.enRussell
dc.subject.enCarnap
dc.subject.enWittgenstein
dc.subject.enHusserl
dc.titlePhilosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication