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Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods

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dc.abstract.enWe establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature and in the actual practice of representation, be it proportional or non-proportional. For instance, we show that proportional approval voting induces the D’Hondt method and that Monroe’s rule induces the largest remainder method. Our approach also yields apportionment methods implementing degressive proportionality. Furthermore, we consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorSkowron, Piotr
dc.contributor.authorLaslier, Jean-François
dc.contributor.authorBrill, Markus
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-25T13:18:18Z
dc.date.available2024-01-25T13:18:18Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.financeNie dotyczy
dc.description.number3
dc.description.volume30
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/0951629818775518
dc.identifier.issn0951-6298
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/113159
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629818775518
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationcomputer and information sciences
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Theoretical Politics
dc.relation.pages358–382
dc.rightsClosedAccess
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.titleMultiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication