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Korzystanie z tego materiału możliwe jest zgodnie z właściwymi przepisami o dozwolonym użytku lub o innych wyjątkach przewidzianych w przepisach prawa. Korzystanie w szerszym zakresie wymaga uzyskania zgody uprawnionego.Piotr Abelard o związkach koniecznych i przygodnych
| dc.abstract.en | The thesis discusses Peter Abelard’s (1079-1142) understanding of alethic modality (possibility and necessity). As a point of departure, I present a line of reasoning advanced in the anonymous treatise entitled 'Secundum Magistrum Petrum Sententie' (SMPS), which has been tentatively ascribed to Abelard. It consists in a refutation of the following sophism: ‘This man is this body; but this body can exist without this man; so this man can exist without this man’. The solution is based on a claim that the mode (modus) expressed by the modal predicate ‘can’ depends on the subject term to which it is attached. Hence, the property predicated of this body in the second premise differs from the one ascribed to this man in the conclusion and the argument turns out to be invalid. The main aim of the study is to place Abelard’s reply in a wider context of twelfth-century logic. Firstly, I describe modal notions presented in his 'Dialectica' and the commentary on Aristotle’s 'De interpretatione'. The theory has been discussed in some detail by modern scholars but their accounts require numerous additions, clarifications and corrections. For instance, I explain why the syntactic analysis of modal sentences with so called ‘nominal modes’ (‘It is possible that…’) which corresponds to the de re interpretation (as opposed to the de dicto one) is labeled 'in sensu'. Namely, these sentences – as far as they are modal – can be reduced to formulas with ‘adverbial modes’ (‘necessarily’, ‘possibly’). Also, I note that the main reason why Abelard was sceptical about the alternative way of interpreting modal sentences – the de dicto explication – was because ‘modes’ that they contain do not ‘modify inherence’. While presenting Abelard’s concept of possibility as compatibility with nature I reject Christopher Martin’s account that makes this notion less abstract and essentialist than it really is. Besides, it is suggested that the negation in modal sentences de non esse (e.g. ‘It is possible that Socrates does not sit’) should be understood as so called ‘cancelling’ negation (negatio exstinctiva) that denies the whole propositional content (‘Socrates sits’). Accordingly, I explain why Abelard seems to accept the sentence ‘Socrates can be a non-man’ as true although his theory allows him only to hold that it is possible that Socrates is not a man (because it is possible that he does not exist). Finally, I compare Abelard’s conception with later, thirteenth-century approaches The second part of the thesis focuses on the argument from SMPS and on significant analogies between the semantic solution put forward there and Abelard’s views from his ‘official’ works. I try to elucidate the nature of so called 'sophisma modi' (a sophism of mode) in order to argue that the SMPS fallacy dismissed by Peter might have been considered by him as such. Furthermore, I compare the change of mode (different modes in premise and conclusion expressed by seemingly same predicates) with a similar mechanism of a shift of meaning ex adiunctis, i.e. as a result of attaching different words. For instance, the term ‘good’ is supposed to mean something different in the context of ‘This soldier is good’ than in ‘This cobbler is good’. I point out that twelfth-century logicians did not always clearly distinguish between a situation in which a given expression shifts its sense systematically from context to context and a situation in which a word changes its content with respect to its ‘proper’ lexical meaning, i.e. as a result of ‘metaphor’ (translatio), e.g. ‘Meadows laugh’. Finally, I discuss the concept of the so called ‘abelardian predicates’, a term coined by Harold Noonan. A ‘monist’ claims that what is believed by a ‘pluralist’ to be distinct items is in fact one thing. For instance, in the case of the problem of material constitution, a piece of alloy is, according to the monist, identical with the statue formed from it. The standard pluralist objection invokes a predicate F (e.g. ‘badly made’ in a particular case) such that the piece of alloy is F, while the statue is not. Hence, the piece of alloy and the statue seem to be different and eo ipso distinct. The monist may then distinguish relevant aspects of the object in question (say, O) and reply that while O as a piece of alloy is F, O as a statue is not, so that no contradiction arises. However, if a ‘naive’ monist interprets the expression ‘as a statue’ as a subject-modifier (forming the expression ‘O as a statue’), his position can hardly be construed as non-pluralist (if it is to offer a valid response to the pluralist charge). Consequently, a valid solution should treat expressions like ‘as a statue’ as predicate-modifiers. This type of monist strategy may be called ‘abelardian’ for historical reasons that are extensively presented in the second part of the thesis. According to this strategy, the predicate F in the anti-monist argument signifies a different property when predicated of the piece of alloy (roughly, being F-as-a-piece-of-alloy) than the property signified by F when attached to ‘the statue’. It is so because F is implicitly respect-relative, i.e. in both cases the predicate must be determined by the aspect invoked by the subject-term. Noonan suggested that also modal predicates (such as ‘can…’) might be considered as ‘abelardian’. In the last chapters I explain why Abelard himself would (or should) not agree with this view. |
| dc.abstract.pl | Zasadniczym celem pracy jest umieszczenie rozwiązania zaproponowanego przez Piotra Abelarda (1079-1142) w "Secundum magistrum Petrum sententie" w szerszym kontekście jego poglądów logicznych i metafizycznych. Abelard musiał wyjaśnić, dlaczego – przy założeniu, że ten człowiek jest numerycznie tożsamy z tym ciałem – z przesłanki stwierdzającej związek przygodny między tym ciałem a tym człowiekiem nie wynika zdanie wyrażające związek przygodny między tym człowiekiem a tym człowiekiem. Jego odpowiedź odwoływała się do postulatu, zgodnie z którym tryby wyrażane implicite przez predykaty modalne zmieniają się wskutek odrębności podmiotów (pro diversitate subiectorum). Opis tej strategii argumentacyjnej poprzedzony jest w rozprawie analizą pojęcia trybu rozumianego jako modyfikator inherencji. Stanowi ono zarazem oś dla całościowego przedstawienia Abelardowej koncepcji konieczności i możliwości. Druga część pracy poświęcona jest odnalezieniu analogii między zmianą trybu a postulowanym przez dwunastowiecznych dialektyków mechanizmem zmiany sensu ex adiunctis, czyli w zależności od kontekstu językowego, oraz ze współczesnym pojęciem "predykatu abelardiańskiego" wprowadzonym przez Harolda Noonana. Ostatni rozdział wyjaśnia, w jakiej mierze predykaty modalne w ujęciu Abelarda mają charakter "abelardiański", tzn. zmieniają treść w zależności od podmiotu, do którego są przyłączane. |
| dc.affiliation.department | Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii |
| dc.contributor.author | Wciórka, Wojciech |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-06T13:18:34Z |
| dc.date.available | 2012-11-06T13:18:34Z |
| dc.date.defence | 2012-11-20 |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-11-06 |
| dc.description.promoter | Krauze-Błachowicz, Krystyna |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/100 |
| dc.identifier.weblink | http://depotuw.ceon.pl/handle/item/100 |
| dc.language.iso | pl |
| dc.rights | FairUse |
| dc.subject.en | ex adiuntcis |
| dc.subject.en | abelardian predicate |
| dc.subject.en | equivocation |
| dc.subject.en | modality |
| dc.subject.en | Peter Abelard |
| dc.subject.en | Abelard, Peter -- 1079-1142. |
| dc.subject.en | Modality (Linguistics) |
| dc.subject.en | Modality (Theory of knowledge) |
| dc.subject.pl | ex adiunctis |
| dc.subject.pl | predykat abelardiański |
| dc.subject.pl | ekwiwokacja |
| dc.subject.pl | modalność |
| dc.subject.pl | Piotr Abelard |
| dc.title | Piotr Abelard o związkach koniecznych i przygodnych |
| dc.title.alternative | Peter Abelard on necessary and contingent connections |
| dc.type | DoctoralThesis |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication |