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The Stability of Philosophical Intuitions: Failed Replications of Swain et al. (2008)

cris.lastimport.scopus2024-02-12T19:49:42Z
dc.abstract.enIn their widely cited article, Swain et al. (2008) report data that, purportedly, demonstrates instability of folk epistemic intuitions regarding the famous Truetemp case authored by Keith Lehrer. What they found is a typical example of priming, where presenting one stimulus before presenting another stimulus affects the way the latter is perceived or evaluated. In their experiment, laypersons were less likely to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp case when they first read a scenario describing a clear case of knowledge, and more likely to ascribe knowledge when they first read a vignette describing a clear case of nonknowledge. We tried to replicate Swain et al. findings in three experiments: one devised in Polish, and the other two conducted in English. We found no priming effect for knowledge ratings regarding the Truetemp case – laypersons were similarly likely to attribute knowledge in all three investigated conditions (primed with a clear case of knowledge, primed with a clear case of nonknowledge, and not primed). These three failed replication attempts are not decisive as to whether the priming effect in question occurs, nevertheless, the collected data puts Swain et al. conclusions about instability of epistemic intuitions in jeopardy.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorZiółkowski, Adrian
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-26T10:48:01Z
dc.date.available2024-01-26T10:48:01Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.financePublikacja bezkosztowa
dc.description.number2
dc.description.volume18
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/EPI.2019.20
dc.identifier.issn1742-3600
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/123167
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.20
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofEpisteme
dc.relation.pages328-346
dc.rightsClosedAccess
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enexperimental philosophy
dc.subject.enreplication
dc.subject.enepistemic intuitions
dc.subject.enknowledge attributions
dc.subject.enpriming effect
dc.subject.enTruetemp case
dc.titleThe Stability of Philosophical Intuitions: Failed Replications of Swain et al. (2008)
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication