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Strategic Evasion of Centrality Measures

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cris.lastimport.scopus2024-02-12T19:30:44Z
dc.abstract.enAmong the most fundamental tools for social network analysis are centrality measures, which quantify the importance of every node in the network. This centrality analysis typically disregards the possibility that the network may have been deliberately manipulated to mislead the analysis. To solve this problem, a recent study attempted to understand how a member of a social network could rewire the connections therein to avoid being identified as a leader of that network. However, the study was based on the assumption that the network analyzer-the seeker-is oblivious to any evasion attempts by the evader. In this paper, we relax this assumption by modelling the seeker and evader as strategic players in a Bayesian Stackelberg game. In this context, we study the complexity of various optimization problems, and analyze the equilibria of the game under different assumptions, thereby drawing the first conclusions in the literature regarding which centralities the seeker should use to maximize the chances of detecting a strategic evader.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.conference.countryWielka Brytania
dc.conference.datefinish2021-05-07
dc.conference.datestart2021-05-03
dc.conference.placeLondon
dc.conference.seriesInternational Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
dc.conference.seriesInternational Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
dc.conference.seriesshortcutAAMAS
dc.conference.weblinkhttps://aamas2021.soton.ac.uk/
dc.contributor.authorMichalak, Tomasz
dc.contributor.authorRahwan, Talal
dc.contributor.authorVorobeychik, Yevgeniy
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Kai
dc.contributor.authorWoźnica, Jan
dc.contributor.authorWaniek, Marcin
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-26T08:19:40Z
dc.date.available2024-01-26T08:19:40Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.financePublikacja bezkosztowa
dc.identifier.doi10.5555/3463952.3464112
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/120788
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3463952.3464112
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationcomputer and information sciences
dc.relation.pages1389–1397
dc.rightsClosedAccess
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enSocial Network
dc.subject.enCentrality Measure
dc.subject.enComputational Complexity
dc.subject.enStackelberg Game
dc.titleStrategic Evasion of Centrality Measures
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication