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Counterpossibles, story prefix and trivialism

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cris.lastimport.scopus2024-02-12T20:01:28Z
dc.abstract.enThe aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the view that some counterpossibles are false. This is done indirectly by showing that accepting the opposite view, i.e., one that ascribes truth to each and every counterpossible, results in the claim that every necessarily false theory has exactly the same consequences. Accordingly, it is shown that taking every counterpossible to be true not only undermines the value of debates over various alternative theories and their consequences, but also puts into question the very possibility of such debates. In order to explicate this thesis, the close bond between counterpossibles and the so-called story prefix (i.e., the sentential operator ‘According to fiction F, P’) is explored. A number of possible responses to this criticism are also presented, and it is argued that none of them address the main problem.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorSendłak, Maciej
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-24T20:53:58Z
dc.date.available2024-01-24T20:53:58Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.accesstimeAT_PUBLICATION
dc.description.financePublikacja bezkosztowa
dc.description.versionFINAL_PUBLISHED
dc.description.volume199
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/S11229-021-03114-7
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/103836
dc.identifier.weblinkhttp://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11229-021-03114-7.pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofSynthese
dc.relation.pages7283–7301
dc.rightsOther
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enCounterfactuals
dc.subject.enCounterpossibles
dc.subject.enPossible worlds
dc.subject.enImpossible worlds
dc.subject.enFiction
dc.subject.enPragmatics
dc.titleCounterpossibles, story prefix and trivialism
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication