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Gödel, Wittgenstein and the Sensibility of Platonism

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dc.abstract.enThe paper presents an interpretation of Platonism, the seeds of which can be found in the writings of Gödel and Wittgenstein. Although it is widely accepted that Wittgenstein is an anti-Platonist the author points to some striking affinities between Gödel’s and Wittgenstein’s accounts of mathematical concepts and the role of feeling and intuition in mathematics. A version of Platonism emerging from these considerations combines realism with respect to concepts with a view of concepts as accessible to feeling and able to guide our behavior through feeling.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorPoręba, Marcin
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-25T02:21:39Z
dc.date.available2024-01-25T02:21:39Z
dc.date.copyright2021-06-30
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.accesstimeAT_PUBLICATION
dc.description.financePublikacja bezkosztowa
dc.description.number1
dc.description.versionFINAL_PUBLISHED
dc.description.volume5
dc.identifier.doi10.14394/EIDOS.JPC.2021.0007
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/108027
dc.identifier.weblinkhttp://eidos.uw.edu.pl/godel-wittgenstein-and-the-sensibility-of-platonism/
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofEidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture
dc.relation.pages108-125
dc.rightsOther
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enconcepts
dc.subject.enGödel
dc.subject.enintuition
dc.subject.enmathematics
dc.subject.enPlatonism
dc.subject.enrealism
dc.subject.enrule-following
dc.subject.enWittgenstein
dc.titleGödel, Wittgenstein and the Sensibility of Platonism
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication