Artykuł w czasopiśmie
Brak miniatury
Licencja
CC-BYCC-BY - Uznanie autorstwa
 

On the Pragmatic Approach to Counterpossibles

Uproszczony widok
dc.abstract.enNina Emery and Christopher Hill proposed a pragmatic approach toward the debate about counterpossibles—i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. The core of this approach is to move the burden of the problem from the notion of truth value into the notion of assertion. This is meant to explain our pre-theoretical intuitions about counterpossibles while claiming that each and every counterpossible is vacuously true. The aim of this paper is to indicate a problematic aspect of this view.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorSendłak, Maciej
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-25T15:46:44Z
dc.date.available2024-01-25T15:46:44Z
dc.date.copyright2018-05-15
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.accesstimeBEFORE_PUBLICATION
dc.description.financeNie dotyczy
dc.description.number2
dc.description.versionFINAL_PUBLISHED
dc.description.volume47
dc.identifier.issn0048-3893
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/114845
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-018-9979-4
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophia
dc.relation.pages523-532
dc.rightsCC-BY
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enCounterpossibles
dc.subject.enCounterfactuals
dc.subject.enPragmatics
dc.subject.enAssertion
dc.subject.enPossible worlds
dc.subject.enImpossible Worlds
dc.titleOn the Pragmatic Approach to Counterpossibles
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication