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Heuristics: Daniel Kahneman vs Gerd Gigerenzer

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cris.lastimport.scopus2024-02-12T19:54:44Z
dc.abstract.enWe examine the notion of a heuristic on the basis of the accounts presented by Daniel Kahneman and Gerd Gigerenzer. The background of our analysis is the use of this concept in Computer Science. The aim of the work is to state a neutral (with respect to its evaluation as a method of rational behavior) definition of a heuristic and to point out the consequences it has for understanding the notion of rationality.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorWinkowski, Jan
dc.contributor.authorWójtowicz, Anna
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-28T20:40:35Z
dc.date.available2024-01-28T20:40:35Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.financeNie dotyczy
dc.identifier.doi10.1163/9789004359475_015
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/153534
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004359475/B9789004359475_014.xml
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.publisher.ministerialBrill
dc.relation.bookRationality and Decision Making: From Normative Rules to Heuristics
dc.relation.pages253-277
dc.rightsClosedAccess
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.titleHeuristics: Daniel Kahneman vs Gerd Gigerenzer
dc.typeMonographChapter
dspace.entity.typePublication