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Descriptions and non-doxastic attitude ascriptions

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dc.abstract.enThis paper addresses a certain objection to the quantificational theory of definite descriptions. According to this objection, the quantificational account cannot provide correct interpretations of definite descriptions embedded in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions and therefore ought to be rejected. In brief, the objection says that the quantificational theory is committed to the view that a sentence of the form “The F is G” is equivalent to the claim that there is a unique F and it is G, while the ascription such as, e.g., “S wants the F to be G” is not equivalent to the statement that S wants there to be a (unique) F and for it to be G. I argue that this objection is invalid as it rests on a false assumption concerning the substitutivity of the relative clauses in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorRostworowski, Wojciech
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-24T21:33:01Z
dc.date.available2024-01-24T21:33:01Z
dc.date.copyright2017-04-28
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.accesstimeAT_PUBLICATION
dc.description.financeNie dotyczy
dc.description.number6
dc.description.versionFINAL_PUBLISHED
dc.description.volume175
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/S11098-017-0912-7
dc.identifier.issn0031-8116
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/104575
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-017-0912-7
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofPhilosophical Studies
dc.relation.pages1311-1331
dc.rightsCC-BY
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enDefinite descriptions
dc.subject.enPropositional attitudes
dc.subject.enQuantificational account
dc.subject.enSubstitutivity
dc.titleDescriptions and non-doxastic attitude ascriptions
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication