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Wittgenstein and the Pluralist Theory of Truth

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dc.abstract.enMany theories of truth have been ascribed to the later Wittgenstein. The reason for this is the unsystematic, antitheoretical nature of his thought and little evidence for his view on the concept of truth. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein's general pluralistic attitude to philosophical problems and concepts inspired the birth of alethic pluralism. However, the same can be said about the epistemic and deflationist patterns of his philosophy. The possible model for the Wittgensteinian pluralist theory are different concepts of truth in different language games, unified by the family resemblance. Yet it is doubtful whether Wittgenstein has one theory of truth at all, even a pluralist one, which is probably one of the reasons why his contribution to the theory of truth is so rich and diversified.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorCzerniawski, Krzysztof
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-23T07:21:37Z
dc.date.available2024-01-23T07:21:37Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.accesstimeAT_PUBLICATION
dc.description.financeNie dotyczy
dc.description.versionFINAL_PUBLISHED
dc.description.volume25
dc.identifier.issn1022-3398
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/125123
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://www.alws.at/alws/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/papers-2017.pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofContributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society = Beiträge der Österreichischen Wittgenstein-Gesellschaft
dc.relation.pages32-34
dc.rightsOther
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.titleWittgenstein and the Pluralist Theory of Truth
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication