Zarys internalizmu ekologicznego w filozofii umysłu. W poszukiwaniu kompromisu pomiędzy kartezjanizmem a enaktywizmem

In this article, I introduce the concept of cognitive niche and subsequently employ it, thereby setting forth a certain sort of internalism in the philosophy of mind. This position, called ecological internalism, is intended to establish a platform for reconciling the fundamental tenet of Cartesian internalism (namely, the distinction between the intelligible, i.e. a domain that is accessible to cognition, and the unintelligible) with the fundamental tenet of enactivism (namely, the idea that the mind is constituted by the organism–environment interaction; rejection of the mind–world dichotomy). I draw on the work of Barry Smith and Achille Varzi who have described in great detail the ontological underpinnings of the idea of ecological niche.