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Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?

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dc.abstract.enIn the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve this position.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorPokropski, Marek
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-25T11:27:03Z
dc.date.available2024-01-25T11:27:03Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.accesstimeAT_PUBLICATION
dc.description.financeNie dotyczy
dc.description.number38
dc.description.versionORIGINAL_AUTHOR
dc.identifier.issn1689-4286
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/112279
dc.identifier.weblinkhttp://www.magazynhybris.com/images/teksty/38/06%20Pokropski.pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofHYBRIS - Online Philosophical Magazine
dc.relation.pages58-73
dc.rightsCC-BY
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.subject.enother minds
dc.subject.enconcepts theory
dc.subject.entheory
dc.subject.enphenomenology
dc.titleMental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication