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Prawo do stronniczości. Gdyby Williams mógł odpowiedzieć Kellerowi

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dc.abstract.enIn the 2013 book Partiality Simon Keller surveys and critiques three most popular theories of morally justified diversions from impartiality: the projects view, the relationships view, and the individuals view. Rejecting the first view, Keller appeals to some of the intuitions which are to be found in the second view to offer his own version of the third. On his proposal, justified partiality is a response to the unique worth of a particular person, the response being determined by the special relationship between the agent and that person. This solution, however, is questionable. The paper attempts to defend the projects view, which Keller rejected, in the version proposed by B. Williams.
dc.affiliationUniwersytet Warszawski
dc.contributor.authorŁukomska, Agata
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-25T17:18:26Z
dc.date.available2024-01-25T17:18:26Z
dc.date.copyright2017-12-01
dc.date.issued2017
dc.description.accesstimeAT_PUBLICATION
dc.description.financeNie dotyczy
dc.description.versionFINAL_PUBLISHED
dc.description.volume55
dc.identifier.doi10.14394/ETYKA.503
dc.identifier.issn0014-2263
dc.identifier.urihttps://repozytorium.uw.edu.pl//handle/item/116841
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://etyka.uw.edu.pl/index.php/etyka/article/view/503
dc.languagepol
dc.pbn.affiliationphilosophy
dc.relation.ispartofEtyka
dc.relation.pages75-100
dc.rightsCC-BY-ND
dc.sciencecloudnosend
dc.titlePrawo do stronniczości. Gdyby Williams mógł odpowiedzieć Kellerowi
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typePublication