Wskazywanie w myślach. Myśli zależne od przedmiotu a semantyka złożonych wyrażeń wskazujących

In this article, I investigate the relation between the concept of object-dependent thoughts(ODTs) and the semantics of complex demonstratives. I begin by showing that a strong syntacticversion of ODTs proposed by Adams and colleagues suffers from problems similar to thoseplaguing several semantic theories (Richard 1993, Larson, Segal 1995). Next, I turn to Eros Corazza’scounterproposal of perspectival thoughts and investigate whether it can provide us with promisedexplanatory benefits. I conclude by formulating an alternative picture of ODTs based on Evans’work and showing that it successfully handles the problems posed for semantics of complex de-monstratives. In order to do this, I introduce and defend a view of individual perceptive conceptsthat may serve as a mental counterpart of demonstration.